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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. A CIA INVESTIGATION FROM 1970

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Our study analyses a detailed report, issued on November 18, 1970, by The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which was subordinated to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War. The role of the FBIS was to collect, translate into English, and make extensive summaries of information in foreign media, especially those within the Communist Bloc, summaries which would later be made available to U.S. decision-makers. The FBIS was an important branch of the CIA, seeing that the United States sought to identify any vulnerability to the adversary, and that the communist media did not enjoy freedom of expression, but instead precisely reflected the official position of the regime. The late 1970s are all the more interesting as the Communist Bloc's monolithic unity breaks down and distinct positions emerge (e.g., the Soviet Union versus China, or Romania versus the Soviet Union), while the United States find themselves in a difficult situation in Indochina, the Middle East, or Latin America.

Keywords: *The Cold War, Communist regimes, communist propaganda, communist broadcast media and press, media warfare*

The history of the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS) – whose mission would be to monitor, record, transcribe and translate into English, and analyse foreign broadcast programs (extended also onto press during the Cold War) – was a long one. It was initially established as the *Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service* (FBMS) on February 26, 1941, by a directive of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was renamed as the *Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service* on July 28, 1942 (FBIS). During World War II, up to the end of 1945, the Service was subordinated to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)¹. By order of the Secretary of War, pursuant to an agreement between the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the War Department, on December 30, 1945, the *Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service* was transferred to the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, but it was not until August 5, 1946, that the Service was placed under the control of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the National Intelligence Authority, the latter being reorganized in 1947 as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)².

This institutional reorganization stemmed from practical necessities – given the bipolarity of the international system that characterized the Cold War period, the United States assumed the role of superpower and world leader of the Western Bloc. A foreign media monitoring service (with special reference to the media in the Communist Bloc) was all the more necessary for American decision-makers, and its transfer to the Central

¹ National Archives of the United States (n.d.). *Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service*. URL: <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html>

² In 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act, which created the National Security Council (NSC) and, under its direction, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). See Britannica (n.d.). *Central Intelligence Agency*. URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Central-Intelligence-Agency>

Intelligence Agency was only a natural consequence. The 1946-47 reorganization also included the latter, and the transfer of authority concerning media surveillance to the foreign intelligence services was followed by the last changes in title: in November-December 1946 there was the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), from January to September 1947 the *Foreign Broadcast Information Branch* (FBIB), only to have it return later to the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS).

The FBIS concluded its activities in 1996, following the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War. Until then, its role had been to gather, translate, and synthesize information into foreign media reports, covering political, economic, scientific, cultural issues and events throughout the world, then to make them available to U.S. decision-makers. The scope had been extended to all foreign media, the FBIS including a *Joint Publications Research Service* (JPRS), which translated foreign language print media³.

At present, FBIS records have been declassified and made available to the public and researchers as complete (on paper) and microfiche reports. Except for the National Archives of the United States or the CIA archive, these documents can be found as *FBIS Daily Reports* in university libraries that are subscribed to Readex digital edition⁴.

The document we are about to analyse is part of a long set of reports that were prepared by the FBIS for the CIA. Entitled «Trends in Communist Propaganda», the report of November 18, 1970, is registered as vol. XXI, no. 46, having 33 pages in its original content. Its authors are not mentioned (only FBIS as the issuing authority). It was declassified and made available for research on August 9, 2000⁵.

In November 1970, when this report was issued, the confrontation, known generically as the Cold War, between the two ideologically and politically antagonistic Blocs – the U.S.-led Western Bloc *versus* the Eastern Bloc built around the USSR – was in full swing. The analysis of communist media was extremely important, given that it was subject to complete state control. If the role assumed internally by the communist media, regardless of the harshness of the regime or its position on the globe, was to present the official message of the leader / single party / state and to contribute to the formation of the *new citizen* (devoted to the regime), externally this press and other sources of information were perceived as the «megaphone» for the authorities of the respective state, even if officially the legislation provided for some freedom of expression of the press⁶. Paradoxically at first glance, it was this total subordination of the media to the state (to a single leader / party, actually) that made it interesting for Western intelligence services. The communist media almost always disclosed the official position of state authorities regarding a particular event. In addition to this, by collecting, translating, and interpreting by comparison the position of the media in various communist countries, intelligence experts could detect cracks in that (at least declaratively) monolithic unity that revolved around the Soviet Union.

³ National Archives of the United States. *Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States...*

⁴ As is the Library of the University of Washington. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*. URL: <https://guides.lib.uw.edu/research/govpubs-quick-links/FBIS>

⁵ Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *Trends in Communist Propaganda*. 1970, November 18 (№ 21(46)). 33 pages. URL: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030051-6.pdf>

⁶ Through excessive use of censorship and self-censorship, media in the Communist Bloc did not enjoy freedom of expression. For the Romanian case, see: Tismăneanu V. (Ed.). *Raportul final al Comisiei prezidențiale pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România*. Bucharest: Humanitas, 2007. 810 p.

In 1970 the political (not ideological) rift between China and the Soviet Union, which began in the time of Nikita Khrushchev (First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union between 1953-1964), was no longer a secret⁷. His successor, Leonid Brezhnev (First Secretary from 1964 to 1982), would mass troops on the common border, and from March 1969 border confrontations escalated, including the clash near Zhenbao / Damansky Island, on the Ussuri River, and the Tielieketi incident⁸. The analysis of communist media took this rupture into account, and American experts considered the major issues which were being debated in the Communist Bloc between the two power centres, Moscow and Peking.

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION, 9-15 NOVEMBER 1970⁹

Moscow (3875 items)	before	9-15 November	Peking (2946 items)	before	9-15 November
October Revolution Anniversary	39%	11%	Pakistani President in PRC ¹⁰	-	26%
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Tripoli	-	6%	Indochina	16%	25%
Indochina	3%	5%	[Cambodian National Day]	1%	15%
The Gaulle's Death	-	5%	[Vietnam]	10%	4%
WFDY ¹¹ meeting in Budapest	4%	5%	Domestic Issues	26%	17%
China	4%	4%	Middle East	2%	7%
Gromyko in Italy	-	4%	The Gaulle's Death	-	7%
Middle East	3%	3%	DPRK ¹² Party Congress	3%	4%

We can see that the Soviet press was more inclined to deal with global subjects, while the Chinese press was more interested in issues happening domestically and in its sphere of interest (Indochina, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and Pakistan).

Going beyond this quantitative percentage assessment of topics covered in the communist press, American expertise will, however, focus either on geographical areas of major interest to Washington, or on topics important in the international agenda.

⁷ For more details, see: Floyd D. Mao *Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict*. New York & London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

⁸ Lüthi L.M. *The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton University Press, 2008. P. 340.

⁹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 1.

¹⁰ People's Republic of China (PRC).

¹¹ The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY).

¹² Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

INDOCHINA

Attention is focused on reactions and counter-reactions between officials in the U.S. and those in the Communist Bloc (through the communist press) generated by the downing, on November 13, 1970, of an RF-4C aircraft, an unarmed photographic reconnaissance plane flying over the airspace of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (a communist state located in the north of Vietnam). In this respect, the Vietnamese mass-media¹³, as well as the entire communist press¹⁴ denied the claims of U.S. Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird (in office 1969 to 1973) that, according to US «Protective reaction» policy, there was a tacit agreement with the Vietnamese regime to allow such reconnaissance flights over Vietnam after the 1968 U.S. bombing of the North ceased.

The FBIS report picks up and critically analyses the statements of Vietnamese communist officials, who were saying in unison: that the vast majority of Americans opposed the war and President Nixon's policy of prolonging and expanding it, without making any reference to the peace proposals made by the same president on October 7¹⁵; that there was no tacit agreement for American reconnaissance flights to be made over Vietnam, that these were in fact a violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as well as a provocation from the U.S., an act of war, and that the Vietnamese people (referring to both parts of Vietnam) were willing to properly punish the adventurous military acts of the Americans, etc. The authors of the FBIS report note an interesting fact: the censorship applied by Vietnamese communist officials (subsequently assumed by the communist media) including within the manner they criticized the public statements of U.S. Secretary Melvin Laird, when he mentioned the infiltrations of the demilitarized area or the bombing of South Vietnamese cities by North Vietnamese communist forces, actions that could have prompted an American response in accordance with the 1968 agreement. Generally, Laird's allegations were either omitted or downplayed. For example, North Vietnamese officials did not recognize the bombing of Saigon (the capital of South Vietnam) with four enemy missiles on November 2, 1970. The only Vietnamese communist reference to the attack was a broadcast on November 3 on an internal radio station in Hanoi (North Vietnam) which briefly referred to an attack on Saigon with «large weapons». In short, the reaction of the entire Communist Bloc was almost unanimous on this issue: the American plane's overflight was a violation of North Vietnam's sovereignty, with the downing of the aircraft being a legitimate act, while the statements by U.S. Secretary Laird were in fact «threats» from the Nixon administration, which was thereby preparing to resume military operations against the northern part of Vietnam¹⁶.

In addition to the ideological aspect, the Vietnam War had a great emotional charge. The Communist Bloc proved to be more adept – at least during the 1960s and 1970s – at coagulating the anti-system discontent of the population of the opposing Bloc, often using the formula of peace fronts, or associations/organizations that were apparently spontaneously created. Their vast majority turned out to be centres of Communist

¹³ Reference is made to Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi Radio Broadcasting, and several articles in *Nhân Dân* (the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Vietnam).

¹⁴ Articles from the Soviet newspapers *Izvestiia* [Известия] and *Red Star* [Красная звезда], comments from TASS (Russian News Agency) and New China News Agency (NCNA) are given as examples.

¹⁵ For more details, see: Hunt R.A. Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military (1969-1973). Vol. VII. Secretaries of Defence Historical Series. Washington, 2015. P. 89-119.

¹⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 3-5.

influence¹⁷. U.S. bombings provoked social emotion, and those who opposed intervention in the Communist North of Vietnam or the U.S. presence in South Vietnam signed petitions or took part in these peace fronts¹⁸. The FBIS report mentioned one such organization, The Popular Front for Peace, founded in Saigon on October 11, 1970. On November 7 of the same year, the Popular Front for Peace presented its program, with a 10-point manifesto, calling for the withdrawal of Allied troops as an inevitable condition for ending the war, the restoration of peace based on the national right to self-determination, and the setting of a legitimate government to represent the interests of the South Vietnamese people. Although the organization or the manifesto did not refer to the North Vietnamese communists, seeking to reflect as much as possible the views (or the feeling that it was expressing the views) of the majority of South Vietnamese people, the way in which the two were reflected in the North Vietnamese-controlled media was eloquent. The authors of the FBIS report noticed this:

«The adoption of the document was reported promptly in an November 8 *Liberation Radio* news item, which noted that the Popular Front for Peace had issued a manifesto on the previous day urging formation of a government capable of satisfying the people's desires and the withdrawal of all allied troops. On the 10th the radio claimed that five Saigon papers had been confiscated and another censored because they carried articles or reports endorsing the Popular Front's 10-point manifesto. Other Hanoi and Front propaganda have cited the manifesto as an example of growing expressions of opposition in South Vietnam to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique»¹⁹.

THE MIDDLE EAST

For the United States, the Middle East was extremely important due to oil reserves, but also a permanently red zone because of the Arab-Israeli divergences. The Six-Day War of June 1967, concluded with an Israeli success, deepened the perception that the United States were a supporter of Israel, while the Soviet Union was one of the Arab world. Some historians and political analysts believe that, between 1968 and 1972, the Middle East was the scene of the fourth open Arab-Israeli conflict, an attrition conflict in which the United States and the Soviet Union advanced peace plans at the United Nations while, at the same time, they were arming the two fighting sides²⁰.

Against this troubled background, news of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser came on the of September 28, 1970. His vice president, Anwar al-Sadat, succeeded him, running unopposed in the presidential election. The FBIS report pays close attention to the transfer of power and, in particular, to the way it was reflected in Soviet media. The election of Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat as head of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) and as Egypt's leader in the party's National Congress, held in Cairo on September 12-13, 1970, had been promptly welcomed by the Soviet news agency TASS on September 12. In the coming days, it published Brezhnev's congratulatory letter to el-Sadat (September 13) and summarized the discussions and resolutions of the ASU

¹⁷ They will operate as real lobby centres in the West, trying to influence political decisions in favour of the interests of the Communist Bloc.

¹⁸ See: Wolton T. O istorie mondială a Comunismului. Vol. III. Complicii. Bucharest: Humanitas, 2020. P. 643-645. See the examples of British philosopher Bertrand Russell, American actress Jane Fonda, etc.

¹⁹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 6-8.

²⁰ Quandt W.B. The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71 // Journal of Palestine Studies. 1971. № 1 (1). P. 39-52.

National Congress (September 14). The Soviet agency said that the new Egyptian leader was committed to liberating the Arab territories and strengthening Arab cooperation, that he appreciated Soviet support and was determined to continue the «anti-imperialist struggle» (obviously against the United States). Also, that he had declared all political and economic resources would be used to create a socialist society²¹.

Alarming for the Americans, as noted in the FBIS report, were the «sporadic indications» from the Soviet media²² to turn the ASU into an «effective political vanguard organization» (a formula which masked the transformation of the party into a communist party, – *our emphasis* – *A.T.*): «to the need to create an activist, vanguard grouping within the organization – a party within a party, consisting of progressive, leftist-oriented Egyptians – to guide the ASU in the proper socialist, mass-political direction». The Soviet press noted with satisfaction that an institute for socialist matters had been established and had abolished the ban on the dissemination of Marxist literature in the country, the study of Marxist-Leninist classics becoming a structural part of the Party school programs. The situation of Egyptian Marxists, previously persecuted, was normalized, and they were given the opportunity to participate in the building of the ASU and to involve themselves in public and production life²³.

Another Arab state that came to the fore in 1970 was Syria. Specifically, that year Hafez al-Assad took power through a coup, eliminating his rival Salah Jadid. This brought a change in the Ba'ath Party (the ruling party in Syria from 1963 and in Iraq from 1968 to 2003). Syrian Ba'athists took power in 1963, but factionalism between «progressives» and «nationalists» was severe until 1970, when Hafez al-Assad (of the «nationalists») secured control²⁴. Although Hafez later joined the Soviet Union in exchange for support against Israel, the 1970 coup was reluctantly viewed and covered by the Soviet media, as Hafez opted to maintain capitalism and private property, as opposed to the options of the «progressive»²⁵, dismissed group. As noted in the FBIS report, Moscow was reluctant to acknowledge Syrian internal developments, and the Soviet TASS agency limited itself to short news, to delayed commentary on events in Syria, to minimizing or ridiculing information coming from Western media outlets concerning the Syrian political crisis, claiming that they were just unfounded «rumours», only to later confirm that there had indeed been «differences of opinion» between the civilian wing, the ousted one, and the military wing led by Hafez. It was obvious, at least in this first phase, from the way the Soviet media (and the media under Soviet influence) presented the events, that Hafez al-Assad's coup took Moscow by surprise, which would have chosen – if given a choice a choice – for the «progressive» civil wing²⁶.

CUBA SUBMARINE BASE

After the 1962 missile crisis, another crisis loomed in Cuba in 1970. Specifically, the United States had information that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba, at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-

²¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 9-10.

²² The report includes analyses of articles from Soviet newspapers such as *Pravda* [Правда], *The New Times* [Новое Время], *Red Star* [Красная звезда], *Prostor* [Простор] etc.

²³ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 10-13.

²⁴ Galvani J. Syria and the Baath Party // Middle East Research and Information Project. 1974. Vol. 25. P. 3-16.

²⁵ A title which hid those groups that supported communism.

²⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 13-16.

firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the «utmost seriousness» by the United States as a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact (1962), by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba²⁷. According to the FBIS report, Soviet media oscillated between denying the allegations, saying they were just American inventions to justify maintaining military spending while East-West relations were easing, and asserting Cuba's legitimate right to allow mooring in its ports to any ship. The FBIS used in its report the news and comments of Soviet and Cuban news agencies²⁸. Eventually, the crisis died down on its own.

SALT²⁹

The disagreements between the Soviet Union and China were visible in Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arsenal. While not devoting ample space to this subject, Soviet media was cautiously optimistic about the possibility of signing this agreement, noting that real progress had been made in previous negotiation rounds³⁰ and that the two sides had a constructive attitude. However, it added that «U.S. imperialist circles have in a number of instances created additional obstacles to the liquidation of dangerous hotbeds of tension and for the resolution of acute problems which are poisoning the relations between states»³¹.

China, which would conduct its first nuclear test only in 1964, disapproved of Soviet negotiations³². According to the FBIS report, for Chinese audiences and by using the Mandarin dialect, Moscow used the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress to defend the USSR's participation in SALT – «an activity within the realm of the general strategy of the international communist movement» – and to assail Peking for its present silence and past criticism of SALT. China's reaction came on November 14, accusing that Soviet participation in SALT negotiations was «another step on the road of betraying the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle»³³.

CHILE

In November 1970, American interest in Chile was determined by Salvador Allende winning the election³⁴, leading a left-wing coalition that included the Communists. The United States feared that Chile could become «another Cuba» and cut off most of their aid to the country. The U.S. government believed that Allende would become closer to socialist countries, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. They feared that he would push Chile into socialism, and therefore all U.S. investments made in Chile would be lost³⁵.

If we were contemporaries of the events and read the FBIS report, we could say that the Americans' fear that Chile would be just another Communist state under Allende's

²⁷ Garthoff R.L. Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis // *International Security*. 1983. No 8 (1). P. 46-66.

²⁸ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 17-18.

²⁹ The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War superpowers dealt with arms control in two rounds of talks and agreements: SALT I (signed on May 26, 1972) and SALT II (signed on June 18, 1979).

³⁰ Negotiations took place in several rounds in Helsinki between November 17, 1969, and May 26, 1972.

³¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 17.

³² Gelber H.G. China and SALT // *Global Politics and Strategy*. 1970. No 12. P. 122-126.

³³ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 18.

³⁴ President of Chile between November 3, 1970, and September 11, 1973.

³⁵ Sigmund P.E. The «Invisible Blockade» and the Overthrow of Allende // *Foreign Affairs*. 1974. Vol. 52 (2). P. 322-340.

leadership was somewhat justified. In November 1970, Soviet media triumphantly announced that President Allende had publicly announced the resumption of relations between Cuba and Chile, as a first step among Latin American countries to get out of Washington's tutelage. At the same time, an article in the Soviet periodical *Pravda* (November 14, 1970) stated that Allende was negotiating with other Latin American states to conclude trade agreements without U.S. patronage and to reopen Cuba with full rights in the OAS³⁶. Other Soviet comments indicated that some officials in Ecuador and Peru agreed to and encouraged Allende's actions. At the same time, the Cuban media described in detail, in the same anti-American terms, the resumption of relations between Cuba and Chile, following Cuban visits and letter exchanges between Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende. Through this same branch of the Cuban media, Havana asserted its interest in resuming relations with Peru³⁷.

FRG³⁸-POLAND

Eastern Europe could not be left out of this analysis. The unconditional subjugation to Moscow of these states, most of them forcibly communized at the end of World War II, had gradually diluted after Stalin's death (in late 1950s and over the next decade), and discontent had led to anti-communist riots or attempts at reformation³⁹. Some of them also took advantage of the ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union, to have (or at least claim to have) their own agenda in terms of international relations. Therefore, the CIA diligently sought to identify cracks in the (alleged) monolithic unit of the Communist Bloc, and the analysis of media in these communist countries was an important element in this strategy.

Against this background, the FBIS report assesses the echoes and comments that appeared in the communist media after the signing of the treaty between FRG and Poland on November 18, 1970⁴⁰. Polish media widely commented on the treaty and praised the courage of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (in office from 1969 to 1974) to accept the Oder-Neisse line as border between the two countries. Other comments, also in favour of the treaty, came from the Hungarian press, while Soviet media only reported on the conclusion of the agreement, without additional comments⁴¹.

³⁶ The Organization of American States (OAS) [in Spanish: Organización de los Estados Americanos; Portuguese: Organização dos Estados Americanos, both abbreviated to OEA], is an international organization that was founded on April 30, 1948, for the purposes of solidarity and co-operation among its member states within the Americas. During the Cold War, the United States hoped the OAS would be a bulwark against the spread of communism.

³⁷ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 21-23.

³⁸ West Germany during the Cold War, officially the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

³⁹ Beginning in 1953, the erosion of the communist system was gradual. Strong anti-Soviet movements, eventually suppressed, took place in several communist countries: the German Democratic Republic (1953), Poland (1956), Hungary (1956). In Romania, the main form of anti-communist resistance was in the mountains, which was practiced by peasants, former officers, students, even pupils. These armed movements were officially eliminated only in 1961. In 1968, the movement of reforming the communist system, initiated in Czechoslovakia, was suppressed by the Soviet army and troops from Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. For more details, see: Judt T. *Epoca postbelică. O istorie a Europei de după 1945*. Iași: Polirom, 2008. P. 287-299.

⁴⁰ Kulski W.W. *German-Polish Relations since World War II // The Polish Review*. 1979. Vol. 24 (1). P. 64-69.

⁴¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 24-25.

ROMANIA-POLAND

The CIA's interest in Romania was generated by the latter's policy to distance its communist regime from Moscow, which culminated in Nicolae Ceaușescu's⁴² public condemnation and refusal to take part in the 1968 intervention of Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia, according to the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty⁴³.

Against this background, the signing, on November 12, 1970, of a bilateral treaty between Romania and Poland, following another similar treaty concluded on July 7 with the Soviet Union⁴⁴, was viewed in the FBIS report as an important step in easing Romania's relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc. However, the report stated that «variations between the two treaties reflect Romania's independent approach in its dealings with other members of the Soviet Bloc, as well as an effort to achieve more flexibility in Bloc relations by enshrining principles of autonomy in bilateral pacts», and that between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Władysław Gomułka⁴⁵ there were divergences regarding the approach⁴⁶.

PRC⁴⁷-PAKISTAN

The last topic discussed in the FBIS report was China-Pakistan relations during the visit of Pakistani President Yahya Khan⁴⁸ to the PRC, between the 10th and 14th of November 1970, a meeting previously prepared by a series of exchanged delegations between the two countries. That same year, Yahya Khan had visited the Soviet Union (in June) and met with U.S. President Nixon (in October). The FBIS report notes – reflecting Chinese media, especially the New China News Agency (NCNA) – that the two countries pledged mutual aid in matters of their own interest: for Pakistan, economic support and PRC support in self-determination for the Kashmir region and in disputes with India; for the PRC, Pakistani recognition that the PRC Government was the sole legal government of the Chinese people, that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC, and that the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations should be restored forthwith. The FBIS report also notes the reaction of the Soviets who, in a short message through the TASS Agency, announced the official visit of the Pakistani President to China on November 10, «on the same day a Mandarin broadcast over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress stressed that Soviet-Pakistan relations are characterized by mutual understanding, friendship, and cooperation, and recalled that President Yahya Khan during his visit to Moscow in June had said Pakistan and the USSR hold the same views on many international issues, citing particularly their close stands on Vietnam and the Middle East. The high degree of economic cooperation, the broadcast said, is illustrated by some 20 large joint industrial enterprises which will be the backbone of Pakistan's national economy»⁴⁹.

⁴² General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party between 1965-1989.

⁴³ Soulet J.F. *Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste din 1945 până în zilele noastre*. Iași: Polirom, 1998. P. 155-156.

⁴⁴ See the text of the Treaty in newspaper *Scântea Tineretului* (1970, July 8).

⁴⁵ First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party between October 21, 1956, and December 20, 1970.

⁴⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 26-28.

⁴⁷ People's Republic of China.

⁴⁸ The third president of Pakistan, from March 25, 1969, to December 1971.

⁴⁹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1970. P. 30-34.

Conclusions

The report of FBIS, a Service of the CIA, is another example of how the two ideological, political, and military Blocs monitored each other during the Cold War, with each side seeking to identify any cracks or disagreements in the opposing camp. Collecting, translating, and analysing media in the Communist Bloc – which fully reflected the official position of the totalitarian leader / single party / state – was another way to uncover these cracks or disagreements which expressed vulnerabilities that the United States could exploit in the future. In the late 1970s, even though there was a détente between the East and the West, that even allowed negotiations prior to the signing of the first SALT treaty, there still were enough sensitive areas around the world where the interests of the two superpowers met and where Washington tried hard to strengthen its position and influence: Indochina – where Americans were obviously in crisis and communist propaganda (including popular fronts) was being effective; in the Middle East – where the Soviets, through propaganda and other methods, were very close to claiming themselves as supporters of the Arab cause before the U.S. (perceived as supporting Israel); in Latin America – where, with the exception of Cuba, Chile also seemed to be moving into the Marxist camp, with Salvador Allende winning the presidency. But there was also good news for American decision-makers, who sensed the cracks appearing in Eastern Europe between the Soviet Union and its satellites, or between it and China.

Even though not a military one, the Cold War was ultimately a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, played out in the media and the world of information, in which each side sought to impose its own version / vision on public and international opinion.

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Тенденції комуністичної пропаганди. Розслідування ЦРУ 1970 року

У нашому дослідженні аналізується детальна доповідь, опублікована 18 листопада 1970 р. Службою іноземного мовлення (FBIS), яка була підпорядкована Центральному розвідувальному управлінню (ЦРУ) у часи холодної війни. Роль FBIS полягала у тому, щоб збирати, перекладати англійською мовою та робити розширені зведення інформації в іноземних ЗМІ, особливо тих, що входили до комуністичного блоку. Зазначені зведення подавалися до вищих ешелонів влади США, що керувалися ними у прийнятті ключових зовнішньополітичних рішень.

Аналізований звіт FBIS (ЦРУ) є яскравим прикладом того, як два ідеологічні, політичні та військові блоки спостерігали один за одним під час холодної війни, причому кожна сторона намагалася виявити будь-які тріщини у протилежному таборі ворожого. Збір, переклад та аналіз засобів масової інформації у комуністичному блоці, що повністю відображали офіційну позицію тоталітарного лідера/єдиної партії/держави, були ще одним способом розкрити ті розбіжності, які виражали вразливі місця, якими Сполучені Штати могли скористатися у майбутньому.

Наприкінці 1970-х років, незважаючи на те, що між Сходом і Заходом існувала розрядка, яка навіть дозволила провести переговори щодо підписання першого Договору про обмеження стратегічних наступальних озброєнь (ОСО), у всьому світі все ще існувало достатньо чутливих сфер, де інтереси двох наддержав стикалися і де Вашингтон наполегливо намагався зміцнити свої позиції та вплив (Індокитай, Близький Схід, Латинська Америка). Але були й хороші новини для американського істеблішменту, які відчували, що монолітна єдність комуністичного блоку руйнується і виникають чіткі позиції (наприклад, СРСР проти Китаю, або Румунія проти СРСР), у той час як США опиняються у складній ситуації в Індокитаї, на Близькому Сході або Латинській Америці.

Холодна війна, хоча й не була військовою, у кінцевому підсумку була прямим протистоянням між СРСР і США, яке розгорталось у ЗМІ й інформаційному просторі, в якому кожна сторона намагалася нав'язати громадськості свою власну версію/бачення подій, міжнародної позиції чи сповідуваних цінностей.

Ключові слова: холодна війна, комуністичні режими, комуністична пропаганда, комуністичні ЗМІ та преса, медійна війна

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